This is an author produced version of a paper published in Journal of Arabian Studies. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Introduction
In December 2012, Arab News, one of the country's leading English language daily newspapers, reported in a piece entitled "A Healthy Election" the successful completion of the first ever competitive election to the presidency of the Saudi Arabian Football Association by its general assembly. The reporter at the time not only hailed these elections as free and fair but as remarkably competitive, with the winning candidate, Ahmed Eid, securing his victory by a margin of just two votes.
1 For non-Saudis, of course, the story itself true for broader comparative studies on civil society in the Arabian Gulf, which again hold few insights into the workings of organised associational life in the region, including most notably on the state and quality of electoral politics within the third sector. 8 Extant scholarship on state-society relations and reform in Saudi Arabia itself, meanwhile, also contains limited output on the country's formal associations and the nature of participatory politics within them. Noteworthy exceptions to this observation include the works of Hertog,
Hamilton, Montagu, Kanie, Matic and AlFaisal, and Kraetzschmar, whose research sheds light on important aspects of Saudi associationalism, including on the legal status of professional, charitable and rights associations and their close connect to the state, on levels of institutionalisation, professionalism and women's empowerment within them, on the operational and contextual constraints they face, as well as on the roles they perform as service providers, participants in national decision-making and facilitators of bottom-up pressures for change. 9 As insightful and significant as these studies are, the Kraetzschmar piece apart, none of them explore in more detail the workings and trademarks of leadership elections nowadays conducted in a host of charitable, professional and other organisations across the country.
Addressing this gap in the literature, this article explores the dynamics and characteristics of associational elections in one of Saudi Arabia's largest network of professional syndicates, the CCI. 10 Based on field research conducted in Saudi Arabia, 11 it presents an in-depth account of the rules and structures governing the administration of CCI elections as well as electoral data collated from twenty-six elections in twenty-four CCIs between 2005 and 2014.
Critiquing a Tocquillian conception of civic engagement, the findings of this article suggest that associational realities in Saudi Arabia -as they pertain to the conduct of plural CCI elections -depress rather than advance the prospects of democratizing associationalism.
This is the case because, although formally competitive, CCI elections ultimately fall short of some of the minimum standards of good practice in electoral matters. Key institutional/structural shortcomings noted in this regard include, amongst others, the statutory powers of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) in the administration and conduct of CCI elections as well as in the composition of governing boards, and the distortions created by the electoral law in levels of electoral competitiveness. Added to this can be a range of democracy-depressing agency factors, which include most notably the resort to political clientelism, cronyism and electoral corruption by candidates to influence voters' preference formation and choice.
Rather than expounding the virtues of democracy, the practice of plural elections in CCIs thus conjures up an image that is reflective of some of the principle trademarks of authoritarian-corporatist governance in contemporary Saudi Arabia. As such the findings give 10 CCIs are chosen here as unit of analysis because they constitute one of the oldest and most prominent professional organisations in the country with the longest tradition of partial competitive directorship elections. 11 As part of this research, semi-structured interviews were conducted with twelve research participants from CCIs in Dammam, Riyadh/Wadi Al-Dawasir, and Jeddah. The interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia in 2010-11 and by telephone in 2013-14, comprising representatives of large and medium size businesses, sitting and former members on CCI directorships, as well as ten male and two female research respondents. All interviews were anonymised at the request of the research participants.
empirical credence to Saudi scholarship that is broadly sceptical of the democratising qualities and capabilities of formal associations in the country.
Debating civil society and associational life in Saudi Arabia
Within the literature on Saudi civil society and associational life consensus appears to exist on two fundamental points. First, few, if any, scholars nowadays contest the existence of some form of "civil society" in the country and its usefulness as an analytical tool to For some, the realities of Saudi state-society relations thus exposed conjure up an image of civil society that sits uneasily with notions of "democratic associationalism" and any theorising on the "democracy-imbuing" qualities of civil society more broadly. Given the predominance of the state over society, its capacity and willingness to restrict and control formal associational life and the lack of autonomy and societal embeddeness that goes with it, these scholars question the capacity of societal actors/groupings to function as effective bottom-up agents for change. Their line of argumentation is hereby further sustained by the observation that for the most part formal associational life remains little institutionalised, is lacking in broad-based membership, constituency support and horizontal linkages and is too fragmented, or simply too wedded to the status quo, to exercise any serious and sustained reform pressures.
17
Deviating from such "pessimist" accounts, others again present an image of formal civil society that does not frame Saudi state-society relations as exclusively determined by the prevalence of authoritarian patronage and regime controls, but rather as one in which societal initiatives, groupings and associations are awarded some potency to function as bottom-up 14 See, for e.g., Hertog, "Modernization without Democratizing?", pp. 65-78; Montagu, "Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector in Saudi Arabia", pp. 68-74.
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Hertog, "Modernization without Democratization?", p. 68. agents for societal change through their rights discourses, (cyber)activism and the use of "reverse" clientelism.
18 Highlighting the importance of discourse, Kanie for instance asserts that:
… [e]ven in a country like Saudi Arabia, the majority of civil society organisations speak the language of rights, ranging from the discourse of abstract human rights to more concrete rights of children women, orphans and prisoners, etc. …. A civil society that speaks the language of human rights and pluralism in an authoritarian context cannot be reduced to another instrument of control…. On the contrary, it can turn into a force that challenges the authoritarian regime and leads to serious contestation.
19
This point is also picked up by Alhargan, who pinpoints to the "discursive significance" of is whether the externally-directed "rights" discourse and activism espoused by many licensed associations is also replicated within; that is whether their internal governance is guided by the same principles (participation, deliberation, transparency) they espouse publically.
Clearly this matters in so far as the quality of internal governance is likely to shape not only individual perceptions of participatory politics at membership level but, with associational elections widely covered in the Saudi press, citizen perceptions about the virtues of procedural democracy more broadly.
As will be revealed below, in the CCIs under scrutiny here internal governance -as it pertains to directorship elections -contains various institutional and behavioural trademarks that clearly violate some of the basic tenets of good practice in electoral matters. As such the CCI case lends credence to theorising in the field which suggests that, under authoritarianism, formal associations not only lack the organisational muscle to challenge incumbent regimes but --by operating within authoritarian-corporatist parameters --are likely to expose some of its principle trademarks, including a lack of civic engagement as well as the prevalence of patronage and clientalist relations. 
The Saudi Chamber of Commerce elections: performance and quality
To evaluate the performance and quality of CCI elections, this article deploys a set of measures that combines key indices of democratic electoral assessment with those specific to third sector elections. The measures thus selected include the following four variables: (1) electoral administration and rules, (2) electoral competitiveness, (3) electoral inclusiveness, and (4) compositional representativeness. As regards the administration of associational elections, it is expected that their scrutiny will shed light on issues of associational autonomy, impartiality and transparency, and as such on whether, and if so how, the corporatist linkage that exists between Saudi government and the chambers is played out at the electoral level.
Electoral competitiveness, in turn, measures amongst others the degree to which election rules and practices ensure a level playing field amongst CCI contestants and whether the preference formation and expression of voters take place within a competitive, free and fair Compositional representativeness, finally, can relate to both the general membership of an organisation and its leadership and measures the extent to which a given association is (1) "representative of its constituency in the composition of its membership" 23 and/or (2) its leadership is representative in its composition of the sector/profession/constituency it seeks to represent as well as its general membership. According to Halliday and Cappell, this indicator is particularly useful in assessing the quality of elections in those associations which are exclusionary in membership composition. Such is the case, for instance, in the Saudi CCIs, where membership is restricted to representatives of the business community. Given the focus on directorship elections in Saudi CCIs, the concept of "compositional representativeness" is deployed here to measure exclusively the extent to which all segments of the business community are adequately represented at directorship level.
Following a brief overview of the status and workings of Saudi CCIs, the remainder of this article examines past directorship elections against the backdrop of the four criteria of democratic electoral assessment identified above.
CCI functions, structures, and directorship elections
Saudi CCIs form part of a growing number of licensed associations/organisations created by the authorities along broadly authoritarian-corporatist lines. 24 They constitute the sole for both these sectors on a chamber's governing board. This is achieved by designating half of all elected/appointed seats to each of the two sectors respectively, and by requiring prospective candidates to declare under which sectoral category they are running for a seat on the governing board. 31 Contestants are thus elected onto the board as representatives of either the commerce/trade or industry sectors; a rule which does not apply, however, to the composition of sub-committees.
As concerns the eligibility to vote/run in directorship elections, the key stipulations of the law are as follows: As for the elections themselves, two voting systems have been used across CCIs to elect their directorships. Until 2008, the voting system used resembled that of the block vote, whereby Commercial Registration (CR) holders were allowed to cast up to as many votes as there are seats to be filled on a governing board, and under which candidates were being voted in on a simple plurality basis. In 2009 block voting was abolished in favour of the so called "limited vote". According to this voting system, which is still in place, the number of votes per CR is reduced to just one, which can be cast for a candidate running on either the commercial/trade or industry-category ticket. 
Electoral administration and rules
Given their corporatist linkage to MoCI, CCIs contain an inbuilt non-democratic bias on this particular indicator of associational democracy. Indeed, whereas in democratic settings syndicates enjoy full autonomy over the administration and supervision of internal elections, this does not apply to Saudi CCIs, whose statutes provide MoCI with the powers to influence the mode of constitution and composition of their governing boards. 35 neither a say over who gets appointed, nor in holding any of the appointed members to account for their record in office. As with the municipal election law, which spells out a similar mode of constitution for the state's local councils, it is likely that this stipulation has been designed by the authorities to counter-balance any unexpected/undesirable election outcomes, and thus prevent the chambers from becoming overtly "politicised" (veto) players in domestic politics, as has happened in other countries in the region.
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As concerns the administration of directorship elections, as well, ministerial involvement is far reaching, covering all phases of the electoral process from the proclamation of the election date, the verification of candidacies, the supervision of the balloting/counting processes, to the confirmation of results. This involvement is ensured through participation in the three member-strong ad-hoc electoral committees which, according to law, are set up by local CCIs to administer directorship elections. MoCI also functions in this context as arbiter in, and adjudicator of, any election-related disputes/complaints and issues the full set of regulations governing directorship elections, including the eligibility requirements for candidates/voters, the voting system used, and the campaign regulations to be followed.
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Although by no means surprising, given the corporatist framework within which CCIs operate, viewed from a democracy-theoretical perspective MoCIs statutory powers in the administration of elections are clearly problematic. Not only do they violate the principles of organisational self-governance and autonomy, but they put in doubt the impartiality of those charged with organising the polls. Indeed, given its regulatory muscle over and physical presence in CCI elections, MoCI is equipped with the tools necessary to monitor and influence the selection of CCI directorships and as such the collective articulation of interests and demands towards the state expressed by the business community. candidates to "buy-off" voters, an issue that will be returned to in the section on "electoral competitiveness". Suffice to say here that, irrespective of how campaign funds were used, there is little denying that the failure to legislate a cap on campaign finance has adversely affected the competitiveness of the electoral game, unduly disadvantaging resource-poorer candidates over their wealthier counterparts.
Electoral competitiveness
For elections to deserve the attribute "democratic" they have to be competitive, that is they have to feature a plurality of candidates (ideally from different parties, or at least espousing different policy positions) as well as rules that ensure a level playing field amongst contestants and prevent the manipulation of preference formation and expression by voters.
On all these accounts CCI elections expose some serious shortcomings. Indeed, rather than conferring voting rights upon individual members, CCI rules link these rights to the ownership of a valid CR, the holder of which can be an individual shop owner, the management board of a local company or a foreign investor with an established business presence in the locality. 44 The consequences of such vote allocation rules are not hard to foresee. Essentially, it means that the more companies one owns in a locality and with it CRs, the more ballots one will be able to cast in CCI elections. This can be just one, of course, as in the case of the lone shop owner, but conceivably it can also be many more, such as for instance in cases where a CCI member is the owner/part-owner of a conglomerate of enterprises. In Saudi Arabia, which boasts a large number of incredibly wealthy merchant/business families, such as the Jamjoon, Al-Jabar and Olayan, it is not unheard of for company boards to hold hundreds of CRs and thus have an equal number of ballots to cast. 45 Clearly, this unequal distribution of votes amongst CCI members is not only problematic from a democracy-theoretical perspective, but confers undue power onto the owners of larger corporations to shape the outcome of chamber elections and ensures that the business elite, with its close connect to the political establishment, remains firmly in charge of the country's business interest articulation and representation. According to some of the research participants interviewed, the discrepancy in candidateto-seat ratios prevalent in CCI elections is a direct consequence of the demographic of the Saudi business sector, which hosts a far greater proportion of establishments in 47 Figures obtained from numerous local press reports, including Okaz, Al-Madinah, Arab
News, and Saudi Gazette.
commerce/trade than industry. 48 In any event, it is not difficult to see how this particular aspect of CCI elections contravenes the principles of electoral competitiveness, given that from the outset it distorts the prospects of electoral success for candidates running for the same elected body. Indeed, all other factors being equal, it creates a competitive environment in which the scramble for votes is far more competitive, and the odds of winning a seat far higher, for candidates running under the commerce/trade category, than for those contesting one of the industry-category seats.
Beyond levels of competitiveness, this discrepancy in candidate-to-seat ratios also adversely affects degrees of electoral inclusiveness and compositional representativeness, particularly with regards to women's chances of gaining representation on CCI governing boards. Although issues of "inclusiveness" will be addressed in more detail belowincluding the problems faced by women contestants more broadly -the intimate connect that appears to exist between reserved seats and the electoral fortunes of businesswomen candidates warrants attention here. This connect stems from the fact that business endeavours by female entrepreneurs are overwhelmingly in commerce/trade and not in industry, which means that most businesswomen entering the electoral fray will have to do so under the far more crowded commerce/trade category. 49 It is suggested here that the effects of this electoral given on women candidacies are broadly negative, and that this is evident both at the point of electoral entry and during the election campaign. At the point of electoral entry, for instance, it may mean that -with the odds already stacked against women candidacies largely due to Suleiman's victory in these elections was the combined result of her astute electoral campaign, her capacity to solicit sufficient support from key businessmen and her fortune to be running under the industry category, which not only meant limited competition for the female vote, but with on average only two to three candidates contesting each available seat, far less overall competition and hence greater chances of electoral success (see Table II above).
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Beyond these institutional determinants, levels of competitiveness in CCI elections are, however, also significantly affected by agency factors; and here particularly by the prevalence of electoral corruption. Indeed, drawing on respondent accounts and press reports, past electoral campaigns showcase both the virtues and vices/pitfalls of competitive politics.
On the positive side of the equation, it must be recorded that most elections are highly competitive, with large numbers of candidates entering the race, and that many of these candidates have fought spirited campaigns, adhering to set rules and earning valuable firsthand experiences in the art of electioneering and electoral mobilisation. Far less widespread, although by no means unheard of, are accusations of ballot fraud and other forms of electoral irregularities. These include amongst others complaints about a lack of transparency of the balloting/voting process, which is increasingly conducted electronically, accusations of multiple voting, and complaints about a lax enforcement by the authorities of CCI regulations.
Electoral inclusiveness and compositional representativeness
When it comes to the final two indices of democratic electoral assessment deployed here to measure the quality of CCI elections -electoral inclusiveness and compositional representativeness -the picture is mixed. As concerns the former, the current rules governing chamber elections are broadly inclusive, entailing no undue legal restrictions on active and passive voting rights for CCI members. Table III below).
How then can this disjoint between legal suffrage rights and actual women's participation rates be explained? As elaborated elsewhere, this author suggests that low turnout and candidacy rates in CCI elections are largely the consequence of prevailing gender-specific barriers to successful female participation. These revolve primarily around "widely-held negative attitudes towards gender equality and their effects on voting behaviours and women's candidacies, but also include the Saudi prohibition against ikh il (gender-mixing) in public buildings and spaces". Whilst representation in the first demographic is kept artificially equitable, through the seat parity provisions explained above, significant representational imbalances have characterised the composition of elected CCI directorships in the two other constituent demographics.
Particularly pronounced is hereby the underrepresentation of businesswomen on CCI directorships, a reality well documented in Table III 
Conclusion
Dissecting electoral politics in one of Saudi Arabia's leading professional syndicates -the CCIs -this article revealed a noticeable disjoint between the formalities of procedural democracy and its actual conduct. Indeed, although nominally no stranger to procedural democracy, with the principles of democratic legitimacy, representation and accountability formally enshrined in CCI statutes, in actual practice chamber elections showcase a number of shortcomings which in no small measure undermine key principles of good practice in electoral matters. As we saw, these range from the statutory powers of MoCI in the administration of CCI elections, to prevailing rules and candidate behaviours that depress electoral competitiveness and inclusiveness as well as the compositional representativeness of the chambers' governing boards.
From a theoretical vantage point the findings presented here thus lend empirical credence to the critics of democratising associationalism in Saudi Arabia and not to its advocates. They do so, however, with one significant proviso, namely that it is insufficient to conceptualise associational elections in Saudi Arabia exclusively through authoritarian-corporatist lenses.
Indeed, it is suggested here that such conceptualisation may only go so far in accounting for the realities of electoral politics in the country's licensed associations. Whilst the corporatist framework certainly helps make sense of relations between the state and licensed associations in Saudi Arabia, and thus of the level of, and motives behind, government involvement in third sector elections, it arguably pays limited attention to local agency. Yet, as we saw in the CCIs under scrutiny here, local agency by CCI candidates on the ground played heavily into the overall quality of governing board elections, not least with regards to the electioneering tactics deployed. Any comprehensive understanding of the dynamics and trademarks of associational elections in Saudi Arabia must thus move beyond a corporatist framing of associational life to include careful scrutiny of the electoral process itself and the conduct of its principle protagonists.
Flawed as they are, CCI elections lastly also carry broader repercussions for the spread and practice of participatory politics in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, if the findings from this case study are anything to go by -and further research into the matter is needed -then it is unlikely that the conduct of associational elections will help instil in the broader public appreciation for and trust in the electoral principle. As Kanie and Alhargan suggest, it may well be that the recent growth in the number of licensed associations has inculcated into the Saudi public sphere and conscience a welcome new discourse on, and growing awareness of, citizen rights and civic virtues. If so, this discourse is, however, in danger of being hollowed out by serious shortcomings that are plainly evident in the internal governance of some of these associations. As we saw, in the case at hand inbuilt limitations on associational autonomy and democracy (partial elections and questionable impartiality of electoral administration) are matched by elite behaviour that in many instances runs counter to the spirit of fairness and equality. Indeed, what has been unfolding in front of the public eye over the past two decades are not necessarily the virtues of participatory politics, but elections that remain marred by occurrences of electoral bribery/malpractice and the preponderance of wealth and oligarchic tendencies at the expense of electoral inclusiveness, competitiveness and representativeness. Worrisome also is the fact that these non-democratic practices are being deployed by segments of the educated, professional and well-off classes in Saudi Arabia, many of whom profess to the principles of democracy and have been actively demanding greater citizen participation in domestic politics. As one Saudi observer surmised:
The outcome of the JCCI experiment is as follows: elite traders, industrialists, and 
